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JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over these matters
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)0).
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.
Does the State's priority lien constitute an illegal defacto
recovery against the Medicaid recipient under the anti-lien provisions of
federal law?
The trial court decided this issue adversely to Appellants in
denying Appellees' 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings. R. 491. It is
a question of law and, accordingly, the appellate court gives the trial court's
ruling no deference and reviews it under a correctness standard. St. Benedict's
Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's Hosp., 811 P.2d 194, 196 (Utah 1991). This issue
is preserved for appeal because it was the subject of Appellees' motion to
dismiss and opposed by the Appellants in a countering memorandum. R. 436,
459-64.
2.
Where the State's recovery is obtained through the
efforts of the Medicaid recipient's counsel in a third party tort action,
must the State pay its share of the attorney fees as mandated by this Court
in State of Utah v. McCoy, 999 R2d 572 (Utah 2000)?
This is a question of law and the appropriate standard of review
is "correctness," without deference to the trial court ruling. St. Benedict's Dev.
Co., 811 P.2d at 196. This issue was a basis for the State's motion for
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summary judgment, opposed by the Plaintiffs, and ruled on by the court. R.
556, 647-53, 703-05. It is, therefore, preserved for appeal.
Appellants, herewith, relinquish all other issues previously
submitted for review.
APPLICABLE STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The following Utah Code provisions are determinative:
Section 26-19-4.5(l)(a) (State's claim limited to what is
actually provided)
(1) (a) To the extent that medical assistance is actually provided
to a recipient, all benefits for medical services or payments from
a third party otherwise payable to or on behalf of a recipient are
assigned by operation of law to the department if the department
provides, or becomes obligated to provide, medical assistance,
regardless of who made application for the benefits on behalf of
the recipient.
Utah Code Ann. § 26-19-4.5(l)(a) (1998).
Section 26-19-5(l)(a)

(State can recover amount paid from
tortfeasor)

(1) (a) When the department provides or becomes obligated to
provide medical assistance to a recipient because of an injury,
disease, or disability that a third party is obligated to pay for, the
department may recover the medical assistance directly from that
third party.
Utah Code Ann. § 26-19-5(l)(a) (1998).
//
//
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Section 26-19-7(4)

(State must pay 1/3 attorney fees)

(4) The department may not pay more than 33% of its total
recovery for attorney's fees, but shall pay a proportionate share of
the costs in an action that is commenced with the department's
written consent.
Utah Code Ann. § 26-19-7(4) (1998).
Section 26-19-6

(Recipient's right to notice and to
intervene)

(1) Within 30 days after commencing an action under Section 2619-5, the department shall give the recipient, his guardian,
personal representative, estate, or survivor, whichever is
appropriate, written notice of the action by personal service or
certified mail to the last known address of the person receiving
the notice. Proof of service shall be filed in the action. The
recipient may intervene in the department's action at any time
before trial.
(2) The notice required by Subsection (1) shall name the court in
which the action is commenced and advise the recipient of his
right to intervene in the proceeding, his right to obtain a private
attorney, and the department's right to recover medical assistance
directly from the third party.
Utah Code Ann. § 26-19-6 (1998).
Section 26-19-5(5)

(Recipient's own action allowed)

(5) An action commenced under this section does not bar an
action by a recipient or a dependent of a recipient for loss or
damage not included in the department's action.
Utah Code Ann. § 26-19-5(5) (1998).
//
//
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case was filed as a class action in the Third District on
October 27, 1995. R. 1. Plaintiffs alleged that the State of Utah, acting
through its Office of Recovery Services, had illegally liened settlement money
from their claims against third party tortfeasors as reimbursement for Medicaid
funds expended by the State on their behalf. R. 22-23.
The trial court certified two classes of plaintiffs on January 26,
1996. R. 98-101. Class I members are injured Medicaid recipients who had
third party liability ("TPL") claims, but who did not retain an attorney to
represent them. R. 100. Class II members are identical to Class I except that
they had retained attorneys who had assisted them in gaining the recovery.
R. 100.
Appellants gave notice of depositions and served a request to
produce documents, which was met with motions to disqualify counsel and for
a protective order. R. 102-05,106-08. The trial court issued a protective order
barring discovery on April 23, 1996, and granted the State's motion to
disqualify on June 21,1996. R. 109-110,231. The disqualification order was
appealed to this Court which reversed on July 14, 1998 and remanded to the
trial court with an order to reinstate Appellants' counsel. Houghton v.
Department of Health, 962 P.2d 58, 63 (Utah 1998).
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In renewed proceedings before the trial court, Appellants moved
for a scheduling conference on November 20,1998. R. 427-29. On November
27, 1998, this Court issued its opinions in Wallace v. Jackson, 972 P.2d 446
(Utah 1998), and S.S. v. State, 972 P.2d 439 (Utah 1998), which declared that
the State's lien against TPL proceeds was legal.
Subsequently, the State filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule
12(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure on October 27, 1999. R. 430-31.
The trial court denied this motion, but in its minute entry indicated that the
precedent set in Wallace and S.S. had effectively negated all issues in the
Appellants' Complaint except the State's liability for attorney fees. R. 491.
Going forward solely on the attorney fee issue, the State moved for summary
judgment, proffering affidavits from state employees which claimed that the
class representatives were either not entitled to attorney fees or had already
been allowed an offset by the State. R. 544-87, 572-78. The Appellants
opposed this motion with a counter affidavit by Attorney James "Mitch" Vilos
stating, among other things, that unnamed members of Class II were not
allowed to offset attorney fees by the State. R. 632-46. The trial court granted
the State's motion for summary judgment, stating, "I conclude that no issues
relating to a named plaintiff or class representative remain unresolved," and
that "the claims of the named plaintiffs have failed on the merits." R. 704-05
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(emphasis added). This appeal arises from the rulings granting summary
judgment as to attorney fees and upholding the State's priority lien.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Filed in 1995,

Appellants filed this class action on

October 27, 1995, seeking reimbursement of third party settlements illegally
liened by the State. R. 1.
2.

Class Members with Third Party Claims,

Named

plaintiffs are representatives of classes which consist of persons, and the
estates of deceased persons, who had third party liability (TPL) claims,
received Medicaid "medical assistance" from the Utah State Department of
Health ("the State"), and who have been compelled to pay or relinquish all or
portions of their TPL recoveries to the State as reimbursement for medical
assistance. R. 82.
3.

Classes Were Certified. The parties stipulated to class

certification (R. 97) and the trial court entered an order certifying the two
plaintiff classes on January 29, 1996. R. 98-101.
a.

Class I plaintiffs, represented by Paul Houghton, are

individuals injured by the acts of a third party, who became Medicaid
recipients, who had a lien placed on their recoveries by the State of Utah
pursuant to the Medical Benefits Recovery Act, Utah Code Ann. § 26-19-1, e?
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seq., and who did not have counsel in their negotiations with the State
regarding its claim of lien. R. 100.
b.

Class II plaintiffs, represented by Damian

Henderson, Billie Henderson, and Wayne Rubens, are identical in every
respect to Class I plaintiffs except that they had retained counsel and actually
filed actions, or made claims through attorneys, against the liable third parties.
R. 100.
4.

Plaintiffs Did Not Get Discovery,

Plaintiffs filed

discovery requests in 1996, which drew a motion to disqualify counsel and
motion for protective order. R. 102-08. The trial court granted disqualification
and issued a protective order forbidding discovery. R. 109-10. After remand,
the State moved for summary judgment, and no discovery was ever conducted.
R. 544-87.
5.

Supreme Court Reversed.

This Court reversed the

disqualification order on July 14, 1998. R. 409-18; Houghton, supra.
6.

Motions for Summary Judgment On remand, the State

moved for summary judgment on May 24, 2000, and for a protective order
prohibiting discovery on July 11, 2000. R. 507, 608. Both motions preceded
Plaintiffs' latest attempt to compel discovery which was filed on July 25,2000.

-7-

R. 688-89. On October 23, 2000, the trial court denied the motion to compel
discovery and granted the State's motion for summary judgment. R. 703-06.
7.

Large Number of Class Members,

The number of

potential class members in both classes is likely very large, since the State has
asserted and collected priority liens for years, and often refused to pay attorney
fees, at least until the Spring of 2000. There are at least two Class D plaintiffs
in counsel's own office, as attested by Attorney James D. Vilos. There were
undoubtedly many others between 1993 and 2000, such as Plaintiff Sevey in
State v. McCoy, 999 P.2d 572 (2000), which case originated in 1993. By
implication, if the State treated others as it treated Mr. Sevey in McCoy, there
would be a minimum of seven (7) years of plaintiffs during that interval who
were assessed illegal priority liens and with whom the State refused to share
attorney fees. Therefore, there are likely hundreds of class members.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
A. The Priority Is Illegal,
The priority issue in this litigation is quite different legally and
factually from the issues previously addressed by this Court in Wallace and
S.S. This case asks the Court to examine whether the State, in according its
lien with a special priority, violates the federal anti-lien law because the effect
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of the priority is to levy a de facto lien or recovery directly on the recipient.
Liens or recoveries against recipients of Medicaid benefits are illegal.
This Court has already settled the basic issue of the legality of the
State's lien against third party tort settlements by Medicaid recipients. Such
liens are not illegal under federal law because they are deemed to attach on the
proceeds of the settlement in the hands of a third party. See Wallace and S. S.,
supra. When originally filed, this class action sought to invalidate the State's
liens on the same basis as the plaintiff sought in Wallace. However, when
Wallace was handed down during the pendency of this action those claims
were abandoned. Plaintiffs do not seek herein to relitigate or revisit those
issues, and they are accepted as binding in this litigation.
The State's priority has the effect of an illegal lien because it pays
100% and pays first, thus taking a disproportionate share of the recovery, often
wiping out the recipient portion entirely. This is especially true with modest
settlements which are inadequate to pay all damages.
An analysis of the applicable statutes confirms the illegality of the
State's priority scheme. When a person is injured by the negligence of a third
party tortfeasor and rendered indigent, that person qualifies for "medical
assistance" under the Medicaid program. However, the injured person is
required to assign to the State a claim for the amount of the medical assistance
actually paid by the State. That claim is protected by law and is left to the
-9-

State to pursue. The injured recipient cannot bring that claim as part of his/her
own tort action without the State's written consent. However, other statutes
acknowledge and protect the injured recipient's right to bring an independent
third party tort claim against a tortfeasor ("TPL claim"), as long as that claim
does not also include the State's right of action for the medical assistance
actually paid. With this exception, the Medicaid recipient's own tort claim is
unrestrained.
Although this Court has addressed the basic legality of the lien,
it has never addressed the effect of the priority. Since the priority often
devastates an indigent, severely injured recipient, its legality needs to be
carefully examined by this Court.
B. Attorney Fees Are Owed,
Regardless of how the Court rules on the priority issues raised in
this appeal, the State still owes substantial money to recipients for the State's
share of attorney fees under this Court's ruling in McCoy. In the Spring of
2000, this Court held unequivocally that the State owed an injured Medicaid
recipient a one-third share of attorney fees for lien amounts recovered through
the recipient's attorney. These attorney fees are owed even though the State
Jid not consent to the representation of its lien interest, and even though the
recipient did not fully cooperate with the State. If the State made its lien

-10-

recovery through the efforts of recipient's attorney, it owes the attorney fee
contribution.
The trial court refused to apply McCoy because of its erroneous
beHef that a class action fails if the claims of the class representatives are moot.
This argument fails on two grounds. First, long-standing legal precedents in
class action cases require continuation of the action for certified class
members, even though the claims of the named class members may be moot or
invalid. Second, since no discovery was allowed, and all facts and inferences
are construed in favor of a party opposing summary judgment, it is clear that
even the named class members have a cause of action upon discovery.
C. Relief Sought
The class members (Appellants) ask this Court to thoroughly
examine the effect and impact of the priority, and rule that it constitutes an
illegal lien or recovery in violation of federal law. Under existing state
statutes, which accord protection to the injured recipient's independent claim
for recovery, it is clear that both the State and the injured recipient have valid,
cognizable claims. Accordingly, this Court should hold that the State's priority
claim is illegal, and that the State must apportion its medical assistance claim
with the injured person's non-medical assistance claims, as is done in many
other states. This result acknowledges the legality of the State's lien, but limits
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it to a proportionate amount based upon the non-medical assistance claim of
the injured recipient.
The Appellants also ask the Court to reverse the trial court and
direct it to apply this Court's ruling in State v. McCoy to the claims of all class
members, named and unnamed. There are a minium of seven to eight years of
Medicaid recipients who are class members, to whom the State did not pay its
fair share of attorney fees on third party settlements, pursuant to McCoy. This
situation may be rectified through this class action.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
- The Priority is Illegal THE "PRIORITY" STATUS ACCORDED THE STATE'S
MEDICAID LIEN IS A DE FACTO RECOVERY
DIRECTLY ON THE RECIPIENT AND THEREFORE
ILLEGAL UNDER FEDERAL LAW.
A. Introduction to the Issue.
The priority status of the State's lien on third party liability
settlements devastates many severely disabled citizens. Class members do not
contend herein that the State's lien is per se illegal, but ask the Court to
consider the practical effect of the priority, as applied, in the cases of hundreds,
or perhaps thousands, of Utahns. The "priority" allows the State to be paid
first and exclusively, and thus to devour a disproportionate share, sometimes
-12-

all, of the settlement proceeds. This seriously impairs or destroys the indigent
recipient's tort claim. Because the priority has such a devastating impact, this
Court should closely examine its validity. The problem is resolved if the Court
requires apportionment of the respective claims.
B. The Legality of the Priority Not Yet Addressed,
None of the three recent cases dealing with the State's lien on TPL
settlements have settled the legality of the State's priority. In Wallace v.
Jackson, 972 P.2d 446 (Utah 1998), the majority opinion does not mention the
State's priority, but it is mentioned in a footnote in Justice Durham's dissenting
opinion:
The briefs also raised the important issue of whether the State has
apriority lien against the third party and thus recovers 100% of
its expenses before anyone else collects anything, or whether it
can recover an amount proportional to the expenses of the other
claimants. We obviously do not reach this issue in this case.
Id. at 452, n. 5 (emphasis added). The State argued below that Justice
Durham's footnote was mistaken, contending that Wallace did validate the
State's priority. R. 533. Specifically, the State pointed to a sentence near the
end of the opinion which stated, "Therefore, we hold that the state has a valid
assignment and an enforceable right against third party recoveries for S.S.'s
injury up to the amount of Medicaid assistance paid as of the time of the
settlement proceeds." R. 534, quoting S.S., 972 P.2d at 442 (emphasis added).
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However, this language contradicts the State's assertion. The phrase "up to the
amount o f obviously means less than the full amount is a possibility. It
certainly does not validate a State priority.
In S.S., this Court addressed whether the State can recover
Medicaid reimbursement for assistance paid on behalf of a minor recipient,
before the proceeds are placed in a special needs trust. The trust would have
completely wiped out the State lien! This obviously was not at all fair to the
State. The S.S. opinion did not consider the issue of the State's priority, but
the State still argued below that S.S. and Wallace upheld a "statutory scheme"
which embraced the priority. R. 534. This argument is misplaced because
neither opinion mentions the priority, but only allow for the possibility of
reimbursement "up to" the full amount of medical assistance paid.
The State also argues that language in McCoy settled the priority
issue. R. 535, quoting 999 P.2d at 575. But McCoy only upheld., again, the
basic validity of the lien under federal law. It did not address the priority issue.
Id. at 572, 575.
The essence of Wallace, S.S. and McCoy is that a lien against the
settlement does not contravene federal law. That is clear. Unresolved,
however, is whether the priority is really a de facto lien or illegal recovery
against the recipient, which would violate the federal anti-lien law. In so
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many cases, the priority clearly and substantially impairs or entirely eliminates
a recipient's claim.
C. State Lien Limited to What It Actually Paid,
Section 26-19-4.5(l)(a) limits the amount of the department's
assigned right "to the extent that medical assistance is actually provided io a
recipient." (Emphasis added.) This "actually provided" limit is reiterated
elsewhere in the Act. For example, § 26-19-5(l)(a) limits the department's
recovery right against a third party to "the medical assistance" paid.1 Federal
law also prohibits a state from seeking recovery for more than the "medical
assistance" paid. 42 U.S.C. § 1396k(A)(l)(a) (2001); see also, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1396p (2001). This limitation on the State's right is important because it
means that without "priority," the State must stand on equal footing with all
other claimants to a TPL settlement. This implies apportionment.
D. An Injured Recipient Has an Independent Claim.
TWO independent, separate claims are contemplated by the
statutes, one by the State and the other by the recipient. An injured recipient's
right to bring an independent claim to settlement proceeds is confirmed by

The flip side of the State's right of recovery is a protection for the recipient
as well. Since the department may not seek recovery against the third party for any
more than the "assistance" actually paid, the recipient's claim for non-medical
assistance damages (i.e pain and suffering, wage loss, future medical etc.) is preserved
and unimpaired.
-15-

statutes and case law. Section 26-19-5(5) gives the department a right to
commence its own independent action against a third party, but "does not bar
an action by a recipient . . . for loss or damage not included in the
department's action." (Emphasis added.) In other words, the recipient has
his/her own claim and may file it, without restriction, as long as it does not
include a claim for the assistance paid by the department.
Section 26-19-7( 1 )(a) reaffirms the existence of two claims when
it says that the recipient may not file or settle a claim against the third party
"for recovery ofmedical costsfor an injury. • .for which the department has
provided. . . medical assistance." (Emphasis added.) In other words, the
injured person is free to claim for the non-medical assistance damages.
Furthermore, even though the department has a right to bring an independent
action against the third party under § 26-19-6, the recipient has an absolute
right to "intervene in the department's action at any time before trial." Id. The
department must also give the recipient notice of: the right to intervene in the
proceeding, the recipient's right to obtain a private attorney, and "the
department's right to recover medical assistance directly from the third party."
Id. (emphasis added).
In sum, both Medicaid ("the department") and the injured person
have separate claims against the same proceeds in the hands of the third party.
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They can prosecute them separately, or together by intervening in each other's
actions. It is clear that the recipient has no right to sue or recover the State's
medical assistance claim, but it is equally clear that the State has no right to
any portion of the recipient's claim (as long as the recipient does not include
the amount paid by the State for medical assistance). The provisions of § 2619-6 (i.e., rights to notice and to intervene) confirm a State duty to protect, or
at least not impair, the recipient's action.
The State's priority clearly results in recovery against the property
of the recipient by taking his/her money or right to receive settlement money.
Money is property, as is the right to receive money. A "chose in action" is
defined as a "right of proceeding in a court of law to procure payment of sum
of money, or right to recover . . . a sum of money by action. . . . A right to
receive or recover... damages on a cause of action . . . for tort or omission of
a duty." Black's Law Dictionary, 5th Ed., p. 219 (West Publishing Co. 1979).
A Utah statute defines "personal property" in pertinent part as follows:
(p) "Personal Property" includes every description of
money, goods, chattels, effects, evidences of rights in actions,
. . . by which any pecuniary obligation... is created. . . . and
every right or interest therein.
Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-12(l)(p) (1994) (emphasis added). The Utah Private
Property Protection Act of 1994 defines private property as including "any...
personal property in this state that is protected by either the Fifth or Fourteenth
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Amendment of the United States or Article I, § 22 of the Utah Constitution."
Utah Code Ann. § 63-90-2(1) and (3) (1997). The recipient's interest in the
tort settlement is clearly property.
This Court has long recognized a victim's claim against the
proceeds of a TPL settlement at the moment an agreement is reached with the
tortfeasor. Blackhurst v. Transamerica Insurance Co., 699 P.2d 688 (Utah
1985). Justice Durham there wrote for the majority that at the moment an
agreement is reached on a TPL settlement, an accord arises between the parties,
"one to give or perform, the other to receive or accept, such agreed payment or
performance in satisfaction of a claim." Id. at 692. An elderly woman had
been hit by a car driven by defendant's insured. The parties reached an oral
agreement on a settlement of the claim to be subsequently formalized in
writing. However, the victim died due to complications from her injuries
before the parties had executed the written settlement agreement. Justice
Durham noted, "In our view, the agreement reached by the parties on March
24, five days prior to Mrs. Blackhust's death, was a completed contract and as
such is valid and enforceable." Id. at 692. Likewise, Medicaid recipients
holding TPL claims have an immediate claim to the proceeds of the case as
soon as an agreement is reached.
As applied to the instant case, each member of Classes I and II
procured settlements with a third party tortfeasor. In each of those cases, at the
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moment that an agreement was reached, a binding, enforceable legal
relationship was formed whereby the liable party agreed to pay a certain
amount in settlement of the TPL claim against it. Each class member holds a
valuable claim for lost wages, future medical care, lost earning capacity, pain
and suffering and other damages. Even though each of these recipients
assigned to the State his/her claim for medical assistance "actually provided,"
there is undeniably no assignment for other damages arising from the
occurrence. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 26-19-5(5), 26-19-7(l)(a). The State's
lien claim on the proceeds is created at the very same moment as the recipient's
"completed contract" claim. Under Blackhurst, both become "valid and
enforceable" at the moment "the agreement [is] reached." Blackhurst, 699 P.2d
at 692. Thus, at the moment of settlement, there exist two valid, competing
claims to the settlement proceeds.
The Utah statutes, combined with this Court's ruling in
Blackhurst, unquestionably confirm the recipient's right to maintain an
individual claim to the TPL settlement for all other damages. However, if the
statutes are construed as the State would have it, the provisions obviously
become inconsistent and nonsensical. Under the State's interpretation, for
example, it is impossible for the State to take its priority recovery and still
preserve the recipient's independent claim because the State takes at least a
disproportionate share, and often takes everything. When construing statutes
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that are ambiguous or in apparent conflict, the court has an obligation "to
render all parts thereof relevant and meaningful." Perrine v. Kennecott Min.
Corp., 911 P.2d 1290, 1292 (Utah 1996). Interpreting these statutes as
confirming two independent claims, one by the State and the other by the
recipient, is the only reasonable way to construe them.

Otherwise, an

unnecessary conflict is created.
This Court concluded in S. S. v. State:
that the insurance benefits were effectively assigned and that
repayment of previous Medicaid expenditures takes priority over
the use of the insurance benefits to establish a supplemental
needs trust.
Id. at 444 (emphasis added). Does this language contradict the analysis above,
in that it appears to uphold the priority? The answer is no. The facts of S.S.
indicate that the priority of the repayment was apparently never challenged.
Plaintiff there attempted to put the entire settlement into a special needs trust
and completely avoid payment of the State's lien. The case merely holds that
an injured party may not use a trust to avoid payment to the State; so in that
limited sense, Medicaid does take priority over a trust that sought to totally
exclude the State.
The recipient may be only one of several parties who hold a claim
to the proceeds of the settlement.

For instance, it is common practice for an

injured TPL claimant to give a doctor, hospital or health insurance carrier a
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lien on proceeds arising from the settlement. This lien typically secures
compensation for care or services provided, and is enforceable against the
settlement proceeds. All would agree that the doctor, hospital or carrier could
enforce the lien once the settlement had been secured. Could the State argue
that its "priority lien" somehow takes precedence over the doctor's lien? Of
course not. If the proceeds were insufficient at settlement to pay both the
doctor's and the State's liens in full, they would have to be apportioned so that
each would share in the settlement proceeds in proportion to the amount of the
respective claims.
Likewise, the recipient retains outstanding claims for damages,
other than medical assistance, against the settlement proceeds. This individual
claim remains enforceable and viable, even after the recipient assigns his
medical assistance claims to the State. To the extent the State uses its priority
to impair these claims, it has recovered against the property of the recipient,
which is prohibited by federal law. If the State could not use its priority to take
from the doctor's claim, why should the recipient's non-medical assistance
claims be any different? They are not different.
E. Federal Law Prohibits Liens or Recoveries Against Recipients.
Liens and recoveries against recipients are prohibited by federal
law:
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No lien may be imposed against the property of any individual
prior to his death on account of medical assistance paid or to be
paid on his behalf under the State plan... (exceptions inapposite
in this case).
No adjustment or recovery of any medical assistance correctly
paid on behalf of an individual under the State plan may be made,
except. . . (exceptions not relevant to plaintiffs in this case).
42U.S.C. § 1396p(a)(l)and42U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(l) (2001) (emphasis added).
State plans must "comply with the provisions of § 1396p . . .with respect to
liens." 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(18) (2001). Appellants submit that these
prohibitions apply directly to the State's application of its priority under § 2619-5. Since the recipient may maintain his/her own claim outside the State's
claim for medical assistance, to the extent that the State exercises its priority
and disproportionately reduces or wipes out the recipient's recovery in these
other claims, it has recovered against the recipient's property. Whenever the
State's priority disproportionately reduces or wipes out the recipient's other
rightful claims, it is illegal under § 1396p.
F. How the Priority Impairs Recipients' Claims,
To illustrate the devastating effect of the priority on the recipient,
a brief example is in order. Suppose a 39-year-old woman was severely
injured in an automobile accident where a third person is at fault, rendered
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permanently and totally disabled, and unable to pay for her medical treatment.2
The State expends $107,000 in medical assistance to pay for her care. She
retains an attorney to recover from the third party tortfeasor. Her total claim
would have a conservative value of $500,000, including damages for pain and
suffering, future lost wages and future medical expenses, as well as the State's
claim for medical assistance paid. The attorney is successful in negotiating a
$110,000 settlement, the limit of insurance coverage, but the State levies it
priority lien for its entire amount of $107,000 or 97.3% of the settlement.
After the State takes its priority, the victim is left with only about 2.7% of the
recovery, or $3,000 which is only .006 of her damages (a little more than lA of
1%).
On the other hand, if the priority was not in place, the settlement
would be apportioned among all parties according to their respective claims.
The breakdown would look something like this: the State would be entitled to
$107,000/$500,000 = 21.4% x $110,000 = $23,540; and the victim would
be entitled to $393,000/$500,000 = 78.6% x $110,000 = $86,460. The
practical effect of the State's priority in the hypothetical is to unfairly and

2

The facts of this example are an actual case currently pending before the
Sixth District in Manti, in State v. Streight, Civil No. 990600417 (the Honorable Kay
L. Mclff). The facts in the example are the actual facts in the case. The court has
awarded summary judgment in favor of the State based upon Wallace, but an order
has not yet been entered and is pending.
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illegally take the victim's rightful share of the settlement proceeds. The
priority in this example costs the victim about $83,000 ($86,460 - $3,000) of
the recovery, dollars meant to provide for her needs and future care. This
$83,000 priority is an illegal de facto lien or recovery on the property of the
victim recipient which violates the anti-lien provisions of § 1396p.
G. Apportionment is Implied at Law and Fair.
This Court may reasonably construe the existing statutes and cases
as requiring apportionment where the settlement is insufficient to pay all
claims fully. Apportionment resolves any ambiguities or conflicts in the
statutes and dicta of previous cases, and is sound public policy. The most
reasonable interpretation of this body of law is that the State has a valid lien
against settlement proceeds in the full amount it has paid, but so does the
recipient have a valid claim for the full amount of his/her damages (after
deducting the State's claim). Where the amount of the settlement or judgment
is sufficient to pay both claims in full, there is no argument. However, where
the settlement does not pay everyone in full, it will be apportioned among the
claiming parties, including the recipient. Apportionment of competing claims
is the rule under ordinary common law and satisfies the dual requirements that
the State pursue reimbursement from third party tortfeasors while refraining
from recovering against the recipient.
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Other states have recognized the need to apportion TPL
settlements. A Missouri statute provides:
The court may reduce and apportion the departmentrs lien
proportionate to the recovery of the claimant. The court may
consider the nature and extent of the injury, economic and
noneconomic loss, settlement offers, comparative negligence as
it applies to the case at hand, hospital costs, physician costs, and
all other appropriate costs.
Missouri Rev. Stat. § 208.215(11) (2001) (emphasis added). This statutory
scheme allows the trial court to take into account multiple factors in
apportioning the recovery. However, the same result is implied in Utah
because our statutes clearly establish two competing claims in the same
settlement.
Indiana likewise requires the apportioning of settlements that do
not result in full recovery:
If a subrogation claim or other lien or claim that arose out
of the payment of medical expenses or other benefits exists in
respect to a claim for personal injuries or death and the claimant's
recovery is diminished:
(1) by comparative fault; or
(2) by reason of the uncollectibility of the full value of the
claim for personal injuries or death resulting from limited liability
insurance or from any other cause;
the lien or claim shall be diminished in the same
proportion as the claimant's recovery is diminished. The party
holding the lien or claim shall bear a pro rata share of the
claimant's attorney's fees and litigation expenses.
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See Indiana Code § 34-51-2-19 (2001) (emphasis added). The Indiana Court
of Appeals recently interpreted this statute as requiring an apportioned
reduction of the Medicaid lien:
[T]he Legislature intended that the [medical agency] have a lien
to the extent of the Medicaid funds expended by the office, except
where the claimant's recovery is diminished by comparative fault
or by the uncollectibility of the full value of the claim resulting
from limited liability insurance or from any other cause. In such
instances (where the claimant's recovery is diminished), the lien
is then diminished by the same proportion that the claimant's
recovery is diminished. Thus, because Pedraza's recovery was
diminished by 80%, the Medicaid lien in this case should likewise
be reduced by 80%.
Pedraza v. Grande, 712 N.E.2d 1007, 1011 (Ind. App. 1999) (emphasis
added).
The New Mexico Court of Appeals ordered apportionment of TPL
proceeds based on equitable principles in White v. Sutherland, 585 P.2d 331
(N.M. App. 1978). In that case, the plaintiff was rendered quadriplegic by the
careless acts of a chiropractor who tendered his $100,000 policy. The State
paid $39,000 in medical assistance and asserted a reimbursement lien for the
first $39,000 of the settlement proceeds, claiming it was "subrogated to any
rights of the recipient against a third party for recovery of medical expenses."
Id. at 334. Relying on the earlier anti-lien predecessor to § 1396p, the New
Mexico court refused to enforce the lien, opting instead for an equitable
division of the settlement money based roughly on proportions. Id.
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Other states have followed Missouri, Indiana, and New Mexico
in ordering apportionment of TPL settlements. Alabama apportions between
Medicaid and recipients, according to the value of the respective claims:
42 U.S.C. § 1396(a)(25)(C) does not specifically require or even
suggest 100% recovery [by the state]. Rather, equitable
principles should be applied to determine Medicaid's right of
recovery and such would depend on the facts of each case.
Smith v. Alabama Medicaid Agency, 461 So.2d 817, 820 (Ala. App. 1984).
Florida has likewise ordered apportionment:
[The state] is entitled to a lien against and to seek reimbursement
from amounts received by a medical assistance recipient from
third parties. However, that amount to which [the state] is
entitled should be determined in each case on a pro rata or
proportionate basis according to what percentage of the total
damages sustained is recovered by the medical assistance
recipient and what percentage of those damages should equitably
be characterized as a recovery for past medical services or
expenses.
Underwood v. Dept. of Health Rehab. Serv., 551 So.2d 522, 526 (Fla. App.
1989) (emphasis added). Tennessee has similarly found that the state is not
required to recover in full, but that the trial court should be able to apportion
the TPL settlement, because federal statutes:
simply mandate that a state seek reimbursement from a legally
liable third party; the provisions do not require that a state acquire
a full subrogation recovery, nor do they supplant a state's law
with regard to the applicability of the made whole requirement as
it relates to subrogation.
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Blankenship v. Estate of Bain, 5 S.W.3d 647, 653 (Term. 1999).
Apportionment of claims is commonly applied legally and
equitably in Utah. For example, in Esquivel v. Labor Com 'n of Utah, 7 P.3d
777, 2000 UT 66 (Utah 2000), the heirs of a deceased worker successfully
brought to judgment a third party wrongful death suit. However, the industrial
carrier refused to pay its proportional share of the attorneys fees, claiming a
100% offset against the worker's net recovery. The Court held that although
"a third-party recovery must reimburse the employer or insurer for workers'
compensation sums already paid as well as offsets for future liability of sums
owed," as required by the applicable statutes, that didn't end the issue. Id. at
781-2. "[T]he employer or insurer must first bear a proportionate share of the
expenses for obtaining the recovery," which included attorney fees and out-ofpocket costs. Id. at 782 (emphasis in original). The court's interpretation of
this statute "ensures this equitable arrangement." Id. By analogy, legal and
equitable principles in this case compel apportionment among the parties, both
of whom have valid legal claims to settlement proceeds.
Apportioningthe proceeds from the TPL settlement is the only fair
thing to do. After all, the recipient by definition is a person in financial straits
who has petitioned the State for medical assistance. Many of the plaintiff class
members have been severely and permanently injured in their accidents and
require long term, specialized care. The proceeds from their TPL claims are
-28-

meant to provide for these expenses and give the recipients some financial
security. Apportionment is a great leveling factor because no matter how small
or big the settlement, the State and the injured recipient still get a just
proportion of recovery. There is equality here.
The Court should note that the purpose of the Medicaid program
is to provide assistance to those who need medical care, not to provide short
term State loans to recipients for medical expenses. The recipients have valid
claims for real damages; they should get proportional footing with the State in
seeking the settlement proceeds.
H. Unnamed Class Members Have a Cause of Action.
One basis of the trial court's ruling was that the claims of the
named class members were moot, requiring dismissal of the claims of the entire
class. This ruling not only ignores the factual issues that existed as to the
named class members, but also constitutes a significant legal error. The claims
of unnamed certified class members always survive, even though the named
class representative is determined not to have a claim. This is argued below
in Point II.B. and is incorporated herein by reference.
//
//
//
//
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POINT II
- Class Members Entitled to Attorneys Fees THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY IGNORING THIS
COURT'S HOLDING INSTATE V. McCOYAND BARRING
THE UNNAMED CLASS MEMBERS FROM
COLLECTING ATTORNEY FEES.
A. Procedural Background of the Issue.
A short explanation of the evolution of the attorney fee issue is in
order. When plaintiffs filed this action in 1995, they sought recompense for
all TPL settlement proceeds liened by the State. R. 34-35. The trial court
certified the two plaintiff classes on January 9,1996. R. 98-101. Thereafter,
a disqualification of counsel order was issued, which this Court unanimously
reversed on July 14,1998. R. 231,409-18. On remand, Appellants were in the
process of compelling discovery when this Court issued its opinions in Wallace
and S.S. which established the legality of the State's liens on TPL recoveries.
Later, on February 3, 2000, the trial court denied a motion by the State for
judgment on the pleadings but noted that:
[OJnly one issue can be reasonably extracted from the complaint
which survives the reach of the holdings in Wallace and S.S.:
whether a plaintiff is entitled to offset against the State's claim for
Medicaid reimbursement, attorney's fees, costs and other
expenses.
R. 491 (emphasis added). This ruling by the trial court effectively winnowed
all of the Appellants' claims down to the issue of attorney fees. R. 495.
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This Court issued its opinion in McCoy on April 14,2000, holding
that the State must allow a recipient to offset for attorney fees when the State
recovers against the TPL settlement, even when the State does not grant
permission for representation of its claim. On May 24, 2000, the State in the
case sub judice moved for summary judgment, proffering self-serving
aftidavits from ORS employees claiming mootness, i.e., that the named
plaintiffs in Class II had already been allowed to offset for attorney fees.
R. 575-78. No discovery had yet been undertaken! The trial court granted the
State's motion for summary judgment ruling that:
In light of the holding in McCoy, I conclude that no issues
pertaining to a named plaintiff or class representative remain
unresolved and that the plaintiffs' Complaint should be dismissed.
I agree in principle with plaintiffs' statements of law relating to
the viability of class actions after the claims of a named plaintiff
become moot. The state of affairs here, however, is not mootness.
Rather, the claims of the named plaintiffs have failed on the
merits.
R. 704-05 (emphasis added). Thus, the trial court looked only at the "named
plaintiffs" while ignoring the rest of the certified class. This is manifestly
contrary to established class action law. Moreover, depriving the named class
representatives of discovery unfairly hindered acquisition of information
necessary to defeat the motion for summary judgment.
//
//
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B. Claims of a Certified Class Continue Even if the Claim of the
Named Representative Becomes Moot,
The court's finding was reversible error because it abrogated the
claims of hundreds of unnamed class members without a hearing. Unnamed
members of a certified class have a cause of action even if the claims of the
named class representatives are invalid or moot.

Franks v. Bowman

Transportation Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976).
In Franks, the United States Supreme Court squarely held that
unnamed class members of a certified class could prosecute their suit even
though the named plaintiff no longer had a personal stake in the outcome of the
case, so long as the unnamed members continued to have valid claims. The
plaintiff truck drivers there filed a class action against their company, claiming
that it had systematically discriminated in hiring and promotions on the basis
of race. Id. at 750-751. The district court certified Petitioner Lee as the sole
named representative, for all black applicants. Id. at 751. After trial, the
district court found that the company was liable and issued an injunction
prohibiting continuation of the discriminatory practices but refused to award
back pay or seniority status to those negatively affected. Id. The Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals vacated the district court's decision and awarded the back
pay and seniority to all plaintiffs except the one class of plaintiffs represented
by Petitioner Lee. Id. at 751-52. The court sided with the district court in
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finding that because Lee had been discharged for cause, his claims for seniority
were moot and the claims of the class he represented had to be dismissed. Id.
The United States Supreme Court reversed, finding that even
though Lee had no claim to seniority relief because he had been terminated for
cause, the unnamed class members could obtain the seniority relief because
they had maintained:
such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to
assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends
for illumination of difficult... questions.
Id., quoting£<3fe>r v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,204 (1962) (emphasis added). Rather
than mechanically dismissing the class's claim once the named representative's
claim became moot, the court ruled that a more holistic inquiry was in order:
Given a properly certified class action, [previous precedent]
contemplates that mootness turns on whether, in the specific
circumstances of the given case at the time it is before this Court,
an adversary relationship sufficient to fulfill this function
exists. In this case, that adversary relationship obviously
obtained as to unnamed class members with respect to the
underlying cause of action and also continues to obtain as
respects their assertion that the relief they have received in
entitlement to consideration for hiring and backpay is inadequate
without further award of entitlement to seniority benefits. This
becomes crystal clear upon examination of the circumstances and
the record of this case.
Id. at 755-56 (emphasis and bracketed words added). The claims of the
unnamed class members were not moot because they retained a "case or
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controversy" which could be maintained within the traditional notions of
justiciability. Id. at 754-56. To determine whether a party has a justiciable
case, a court should consider whether the case was presented in an adversary
context, whether the dispute was capable of resolution through the judicial
process, and whether the proposed resolution would violate separation of
powers principles. Id. at 754, quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 94-95
(1968).
Even though the named plaintiff had been discharged for cause
and was ineligible for the seniority relief granted, the unnamed members of the
class retained valid claims for relief and would be directly benefitted by the
grant of seniority. Franks, 424 U.S. at 756-57. They had justiciable claims.
The Court expressly rejected the knee-jerk, reactionary approach used by the
trial court in this case where an automatic dismissal resulted from a token
showing by the defense that the named plaintiffs may not have a claim.
In the instant case, suppose hypothetically there are 1,000
members of the class.

The named class representative was allegedly

determined four years into the litigation to have no justiciable claim, but the
other 999 class members do have a claim. Why on earth should the case be
dismissed? Such a result is very unjust.
The Tenth Circuit has also acknowledged the certified class
exception to the mootness doctrine in Napier v. Gertrude, 542 F.2d 825 (10th
-34-

Cir. 1976). The action will not be held moot, despite the named plaintiff,
where the suit has been "duly certified as a class action." Id. at 826. The court
noted that, "upon certification, the class of unnamed persons acquires a legal
status separate from the named plaintiff, and its existence satisfies the 'cases
or controversies' requirement of Article III of the Constitution." Id., quoting
Franks, 424 U.S. at 827.
The Class II plaintiffs have shown that their positions are so
concretely adverse to the State that their continued litigation of the case will
sharpen the issues before the court. As in Franks, the Third District Court
certified two valid classes where the class representatives had bona fide
controversies typical of the classes they represented. R. 98-101; Franks, 424
U.S. at 751. As required by that certification, all named plaintiffs at that time
were determined to be members of their respective classes and to adequately
represent the members of those classes. R. 98-101. Notably, the State did not
oppose the motion to certify and stipulated to the certification of the classes.
R. 97. Accordingly, each of these possibly hundreds of individuals is entitled
to the right guaranteed under McCoy, even if their class representative no
longer has a stake for attorney fees. See Franks, 424 U.S. at 751.
The only evidence reviewed by the trial court in considering the
motion for summary judgment was self-serving affidavits from ORS employees
concerning the alleged status of the cases of Billie Henderson, Damian
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Henderson, and Wayne Rubens, the named class representatives. R. 572-78.
These affidavits claimed either that the named plaintiff did not incur attorney
fees or that attorney fees were offset. Citing Rule 23(a) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, the State contended:
[N]one of the named plaintiffs or class representatives have such
a claim. Therefore, the claim cannot be brought or continued by
the unnamed members of the class. As a result, the entire class
action must be dismissed.
R. 561 (emphasis added). The State cited no case law for the highlighted part
of the passage above! Appellants are not aware of any precedent to support the
proposition that an entire class action must be dismissed if the named class
representative is proven not to have a claim. Yet, that is why the trial court
dismissed the case. R. 704-5 (athe claims of the named plaintiffs have failed
on the merits").
C. Contested Issues of Fact on Class Members.
There is substantive evidence that Class II has many members
with valid claims. The affidavit of Attorney Mitch Vilos attests that at least two
of his clients had liens placed on their settlements by the State and were not
allowed to offset attorney fees. R. 632-34. This is only the tip of a very large
iceberg, as suggested by the example of David Sevey in McCoy. Sevey, a
recipient, was denied permission by the State to represent its claim in 1993,
made a recovery on his own, and then had a portion of the recovery taken by
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the State without being allowed to offset attorney fees. Seven years passed
until McCoy was decided. Surely, Sevey was not a universe of one; there must
have been many more like him.
It was counsel's personal experience during this same time frame
that denial of consent and failure to offset were more the rule than the
exception. R. 632-34. When discovery is finally allowed, we expect to find
at least several hundred legitimate plaintiffs in this category.
The outlandish reality was that in the pre-McCoy world, the State
did not have to pay attorney fees unless it gave permission. So, in many of the
best cases, the State would simply deny permission, await the recovery by the
recipient, and then step in to grab its payment in full without having to pay a
dime. The hundreds of Utahns who were so treated should be allowed to
recover the State's share of attorney fees. This injustice requires that the
unnamed class members have their day in court.
"Summary judgment is appropriate only when there is a showing
'that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.'" Dairy Product Services, Inc. v. City
of Wellsville, 13 P.3d 581, 587 (Utah 2000) (citations omitted). When
considering an appeal from a grant of summary judgment, the appellate court
should view the facts and all inferences therefrom in a light most favorable to
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the losing party below. See Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. State, 779 P.2d 634,
636 (Utah 1989).
In the case at hand, there is a dispute of material fact as to whether
unnamed members of the class were allowed to offset attorney fees and costs
against the State's recovery. Plaintiffs offered sufficient evidence of a dispute
of material fact in the form of an affidavit proving that certain unnamed
plaintiff class members were not allowed to offset their payments to the State
for attorney fees. This Court has held that, "It only takes one sworn statement
to dispute averments on the other side of the controversy and create an issue
of fact, precluding summary judgment.'' Holbrook Co. v. Adams, 524 P.2d
191, 193 (Utah 1975). In considering the motion for summary judgment, the
trial court's "sole inquiry is whether there is a material issue of fact to be
decided" and any attempt by the court to weigh contradicting evidence is
improper. Spor v. Crested Butte Silver Mining, Inc., 740 P.2d 1304 (Utah
1987).
The record shows that the class members filed an Affidavit of
James D. Vilos on July 25, 2000, stating the affiant's personal knowledge of
the State's refusal to allow two unnamed members, Carol Houtz and Kenny
Nattress, to offset attorney fees from the reimbursement they paid the State.
R. 632-46. This one sworn statement was enough to create an issue of material
fact as to whether there are class members who have not been allowed to offset
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for attorney fees. But there is far more evidence by way of reasonable
inference, since seven years passed between the State's denial of Sevey in
McCoy and the McCoy decision. There are, undoubtedly, many more unnamed
plaintiffs out there just like Sevey. Appellants therefore met their burden of
showing a material fact in issue and the motion for summary judgment should
have been denied.
As to the named plaintiffs, Appellants have been prohibited from
conducting discovery and, therefore, have been unable to establish the veracity
of these alleged offsets. R. 572-78. As a rule, summary judgment is not
appropriate if discovery is incomplete because a party may obtain information
through discovery that creates genuine issues of material fact which would
allow the party to defeat the motion for summary judgment. Downtown
Athletic Club v. Horman, 740 P.2d 275 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 765 P.2d
1277 (1987). Since Appellants were not permitted to conduct any discovery
from the earliest stages of this case, they were handcuffed in their attempts to
gather enough information to refute the State's affidavits.
D. McCoy Dispositively Resolved the Issue of Attorney Fees
in Favor of Appellants,
McCoy held that a Medicaid recipient whose injuries stemmed
from a third party liability case may offset one-third of the State's recovery of
those benefits for attorney fees and costs. See 999 P.2d 572, 575-76 (Utah
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2000). The right is virtually unlimited. The applicant need not request
permission, the State need not grant consent, and the applicant need provide
omy limited cooperation. As to consent, uthe attorney fees portion of [the
statute] in no way limits the award of attorney fees to recipients who obtained
consent to pursue the State's claim." Id. at 576 (parenthetical added). As to
cooperation, the recipient's duty is limited to "identifying and providing
information to assist the State in pursuing any third party who may be liable to
pay for medical care and services." Id. at 577, fn. 4. However, no more
cooperation is necessary than merely identifying the potential individual
because, "McCoy failed to keep the State minimally informed, but McCoy's
lack of forthrightness did not prejudice the State's claim against the third
party." Id. Justice Russon noted that:
while the Act provides discretion to the State when selecting a
suitable avenue for recovering medical assistance, each method
of recovery requires the State to pay its share of attorney fees.
Id. (emphasis added). The opinion accepts a fact that attorneys who have
represented Medicaid recipients have long known, that:
it would be inherently unfair not to award attorney fees to
McCoy, who has followed the requirements of the Act in securing
a recovery in behalf of his client.
Id. The State may pursue reimbursement through various methods, but it must
always pay its share of fees:
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The State may (1) take action directly against the third party, for
which the State pays its own expenses; (2) grant consent to
recipients seeking to pursue the State's claim, whereby the State's
recovery will be reduced by reasonable attorney fees and, if any,
its proportionate share of the costs of an action; or (3) refuse
consent and proceed against the recipient after the recipient
recovers from the third party, in which case the State9s recovery
shall be reduced by reasonable attorney's fees.
Id. (emphasis and double emphasis added). The State has no options here. If
it recovers reimbursement due to the efforts of the recipient's attorney, it owes
an attorney fee. That is imminently fair.
The trial court erred when it refused to apply McCoy to the
unnamed members of Class II. The court's decision is bereft of any indication
as to why it failed to consider the outstanding rights of the unnamed members
of Class II to claim attorney fees against the State. R. 704-5. In fact,
quizzically, the court notes in a footnote that McCoy requires the State to pay
attorney fees but makes no mention of unnamed class members who have not
been allowed an offset for attorney fees. R. 704, n. 1. One can only conclude
that the trial court failed to consider the viable claims of unnamed class
members who were not allowed to offset.
The impact of requiring the State to pay its share of recoveries
will be immediate and beneficial to the recipients involved. Since most
attorneys take their contingency fees on a percentage of the gross settlement
proceeds, most fee monies repaid by the State as a result of this class action
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will go back into the pockets of the needy recipients, not the attorneys who
have already been paid. These funds will go toward providing for the victims'
future care and help insure their well-being.
CONCLUSION
The State's priority constitutes an illegal lien or recovery under
federal law because it takes a disproportionate amount - sometimes the
entirety - of the recipient's TPL recovery. Utah statutes clearly contemplate
an independent third party tort claim by the recipient, as long as the claim does
not include the State's medical assistance claim. On the other hand, the State's
claim is statutorily limited to the amount of medical assistance it has paid. At
the moment of settlement, therefore, there are two valid claims on the
settlement proceeds, the State's medical assistance lien and the recipient's
claim for all other damages. The application of the priority substantially
impairs or destroys the recipient's claim, which is inconsistent with the many
state and federal statutes which purport to protect that claim. The only way to
resolve this apparent conflict, while protecting the interests of both the State
and the recipient, is to apportion the claims as many other states do. This
apportionment is implied by the statutes and Utah case law, and is fair.
This Court ruled unequivocally in McCoy that a recipient who
recovers Medicaid reimbursement for the State from a third party tortfeasor is
entitled to have the State pay a one-third attorney fee on the State's recovery.
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There is significant evidence in the record, as well as reasonable inferences,
that there were many class members who were denied this attorney fee
contribution. Even if, after discovery, the named class representatives are
determined to not have a cause of action, the unnamed, certified class
members, as a matter of law, have a right to a hearing on their claims. It was
error for the trial court not to apply McCoy to unnamed, certified class
members.
Accordingly, the summary judgment should be reversed as to all
class members, and the matter should be remanded to the district court for
further proceedings.
DATED this 20th day of September, 2001.
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